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Montgomery and informed consent: where arewe now?
OPEN ACCESS
The Montgomery case in 2015 was a landmark for informed consent in the UK.Two years on, Sarah
Chan and colleagues discuss the consequences for practising doctors
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TheMontgomery v Lanarkshire case ofMarch 20151 drew fresh
attention to informed consent. Nadine Montgomery, a woman
with diabetes and of small stature, delivered her son vaginally;
he experienced complications owing to shoulder dystocia,
resulting in hypoxic insult with consequent cerebral palsy. Her
obstetrician had not disclosed the increased risk of this
complication in vaginal delivery, despite Montgomery asking
if the baby’s size was a potential problem. Montgomery sued
for negligence, arguing that, if she had known of the increased
risk, she would have requested a caesarean section. The Supreme
Court of the UK announced judgment in her favour in March
2015. The ruling overturned a previous decision by the House
of Lords,2 which had been law since at least the mid 1980s.3 It
established that, rather than being a matter for clinical judgment
to be assessed by professional medical opinion, a patient should
be told whatever they want to know, not what the doctor thinks
they should be told.
Many organisations (in particular the General Medical Council,
who intervened to make submissions in the case) said that the
Montgomery decision had simply enabled UK law to catch up
with current GMC guidance; others hailed it “the most important
UK judgment on informed consent for 30 years.”4Doctors have
expressed their concerns about its potentially radical effects on
patient care and clinical practice.5 We held a public debate in
2015, including doctors, lawyers, and medical students, which
showed renewed tension between the professional discretion of
doctors and patients’ choices6; indeed, the verdict has been
characterised as supporting patient autonomy over medical
paternalism.3-9But what are the implications for doctors’ practice
and their legal liability? Two years after the Supreme Court’s
decision, we examine the effects of the Montgomery ruling on
clinical and medicolegal practice.
Response to the ruling
Some clinicians said that retrospective application of the
judgment could “open the floodgates” for claims in relation to
doctors’ past actions.10 Others thought that the Montgomery
ruling was unlikely to have this effect, however “excited the
claimant law firms might become initially.”11 Legal opinions
were reserved, describing the ruling as “the belated obituary,
not the death knell, of medical paternalism.”12 Some argued that
the standard imposed by the Montgomery decision merely
reflected good practice as already specified by the GMC13 and
would make little practical difference to clinicians.8
Nevertheless, the concern generated by the ruling might affect
doctors’ behaviour and other potential cases. Others have raised
questions about the implications for the legal treatment of
clinical judgment, suggesting that it represents “a radical move
away from English law’s traditional respect for clinical
expertise.”9
Doctors at the coalface have received little official direction on
how their practice should change in light of the ruling. We have
heard anecdotally that some hospitals are in the process of
updating their procedures on informed consent, but few have
completed this. Although the Medical Defence Union and the
Medical Protection Society have each issued statements and
updated their guidance, as have some royal colleges (such as
the Royal College of Surgeons), other bodies such as the GMC
and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
(RCOG) have yet to do so.
RCOG’s difficulty in providing guidance perhaps reflects the
unique nature of obstetrics—essentially helping two patients
through a normal and inevitable physiological process. A further
challenge is that the risks of birth can change dramatically and
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quickly, making detailed discussion and informed decision
making difficult. These “emergencies” might be exempt from
the Montgomery ruling, depending on their nature and timing,
but complications of labour (such as sudden and profound fetal
distress or major maternal haemorrhage) are not, even though,
as was noted in the judgment, choices about management of
labour cannot generally be deferred. GMC guidance says that
the consenting process is not a snapshot but an ongoing process.
Planning for labour emergencies is essential, so that the doctor
and patient can discuss the patient’s wishes if an emergency
should arise.
RCOG has proposed pilot programmes to identify what
resources women, clinicians, and health services need to comply
with theMontgomery ruling. Training and educational materials
must be fit for purpose. Obstetricians urgently need guidance.
Legal consequences for doctors
The Montgomery decision redefined the standard for informed
consent and disclosure. Previously, the Bolam test14 in England
and the Hunter v Hanley test15 in Scotland were used to
determine what should be disclosed. These tests ask whether a
doctor’s conduct would be supported by a responsible body of
clinicians. The Bolam test was affirmed in Sidaway v Bethlem
Royal Hospital Governors and others,2 although the ruling was
not unanimous, with judges placing different weight on the
patient’s right to make informed treatment decisions versus the
doctor’s professional judgment in disclosing information. The
Montgomery case firmly rejected the application of Bolam to
consent, establishing a duty of care to warn of material risks.
The test of materiality defined in the Montgomery ruling was
whether “a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be
likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should
reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely
to attach significance to it.”1 The solicitor representing
Montgomery spoke of the decision as having “modernised the
law on consent and introduced a patient focused test to UK
law.”16
Retrospective cases
Constitutionally, the Supreme Court cannot make new law; it
can only state what, in theory, the law has always been. Doctors
may have been treating patients as they understood the law to
be, as in the Sidaway case, but the Supreme Court has told us
that this was wrong3 and that anyone who practised according
to Sidaway was also wrong.
In practical terms, the ruling should apply at least back to 1999,
when Montgomery saw her obstetrician. Guidance in effect at
that time from the GMC,17 BMA,18 NHS, and the Scottish
Office19 supported a doctor’s duty to disclose relevant
information and risks. So theMontgomery principles have been
known—or should have been known—by doctors for many
years.
Since theMontgomery ruling, several attempts have beenmade
to introduce a consent based claim to cases that were under way
before the decision. One such attempt in Scotland has, so far,
been unsuccessful.20 Two English cases have allowed consent
claims to be added after the Montgomery decision.21 22 Some
cases have succeeded on a Montgomery basis23; we (AA)
understand that others have settled before litigation ever started
or was concluded, as the claims were unanswerable in the light
of Montgomery. We (ESC) have noticed that a considerable
proportion of cases of obstetric negligence raised since
Montgomery involve consent in addition to standard complaints
of substandard care. These issues are not always pursued, but
obstetric litigation practice has noticeably changed, making
professional training and clarity with respect to guidelines an
even higher priority.
Subsequent cases
Looking at some of the cases in which the Montgomery ruling
has been considered tells us about its interpretation to date. In
Spencer v Hillingdon NHS Trust (April 2015)23 the patient had
bilateral pulmonary emboli after a hernia operation. He did not
seek treatment immediately because he had not been advised
of the risk of deep vein thrombosis or pulmonary embolism or
of symptoms that might indicate these. The judge considered
the Montgomery ruling and found that failure to inform the
patient was a breach of the duty of care.
Shaw v Kovac (October 2015)24 concerned a patient who died
in 2007 after a transaortic valve implantation, which was then
still the subject of clinical trials and not fully approved. The
claimant’s argument sought to use the Montgomery ruling to
ground a claim for damages for the loss of life without informed
consent. The court rejected this, holding that the Montgomery
ruling did not create a right to informed consent as an
independent cause of action, but simply set a new legal standard
for the duty to disclose.
In Mrs A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation
Trust (April 2015),25 the claimant’s baby, who was conceived
using intracytoplasmic sperm injection, had a chromosomal
abnormality. The claimant alleged that the trust was negligent
in failing to advise of this possibility. The court applied the
Montgomery test and decided that the risk was not material,
because neither a reasonable patient nor the patient herself would
have attached significance to it. Thus, although the test is
focused on patients, doctors are not liable for every omission
of disclosure to which a patient later objects.”25
Clinical concerns and ethical arguments
Some doctors feared that more stringent disclosure requirements
would risk overwhelming patients with information, causing
distress or leading them to make poor decisions, while doctors’
time would be taken up with lengthy explanations, creating a
drain on healthcare resources. Information overload is unlikely
given that information should be tailored to the patient. But
doctors must judge what is appropriate for each patient and how
their exercise of judgment might be assessed by the courts. The
doctor might think that disclosure of certain information could
lead the patient to a decision that is not in their best interests,
as was true for the Montgomery case. But the ethical and legal
position is clear: doctors must not withhold information simply
because they disagree with the decision the patient is likely to
make if given that information.
Making sure that patients understand all the information they
need to make a decision will inevitably take longer. But
allocation of health resources should be tackled systematically
rather than individually. Healthcare policy should cover, for
example, which treatments should be available and how consent
procedures should be handled.17 The doctor’s duty is simply to
treat patients according to their interests, which might include
being given more information than usual.
A second concern was that the ruling would encourage
“defensivemedicine,” shifting the focus from helping the patient
to protecting the doctor. But doctors should have already been
following GMC guidance, which highlights the importance of
communication.13
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Finally, doctors criticised the focus of patient autonomy over
medical paternalism. But this is a false dichotomy—the idea of
a fully autonomous patient making choices completely
independent of the doctor’s input does not reflect the complex
reality of medical decision making, nor does the caricature of
a paternalistic doctor riding roughshod over patients’ objections.
Patients are not always aware of the facts of their treatment after
consent related discussions,26 and they are influenced by the
way in which information is presented (the “framing effect”).27
But the difficulties of conveying information about treatment
and risks should not be taken to indicate that patients are
incapable of understanding medical information or that patient
autonomy in decision making is meaningless. Rather it shows
that the communication process has a strong influence on how
patients understand, remember, and evaluate information—all
of which are essential to informed consent. The doctor’s role is
to ensure that relevant information is presented to enable the
patient to use it meaningfully.
Conclusions
TheMontgomery case was framed as a clash of values—patient
autonomy versus medical paternalism. In reality, medical
decision making involves a nuanced negotiation of information.
Today’s patients can expect a more active and informed role in
treatment decisions, with a corresponding shift in emphasis on
various values, including autonomy, in medical ethics.
The full implications of the case are undoubtedly still unknown,
but Montgomery has clear relevance for medical law and ethics.
Legally, consent law has been clarified and aligns with current
GMC guidance, and the Montgomery test has already been
applied in several cases. Ethically, it clarifies the existing shift
towards a more cooperative approach in the consultation room.
The Montgomery ruling has not radically changed the process
of consent; it has simply given appropriate recognition to
patients as decision makers.
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